David Meets Goliath in the Legislative Arena: A Losing Battle for an Equal Charitable Voice by Wachtel, Edward W.
DAVID MEETS GOLIATH IN THE LEGISLATIVE
ARENA: A LOSING BATTLE FOR AN
EQUAL CHARITABLE VOICE?
It is discriminatory not to allow tax exempt organizations to
advocate directly before Congress on an equal basis with private
business. Moreover, these organizations can be a valuable source
of information. They can broaden legislators' understanding of
proposed legislation, and they can suggest valuable legislative
alternatives.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Power to the People! This ever recurring demand of the young
and old alike is a symptom of our times. It points to a common
desire of all who are actively pursuing change in our communities,
institutions and government. It sounds the cry of an informed
citizenry frustrated in their attempts to participate in a legislative
system which seeks to exclude their voice.
President Nixon recently pleaded for the involvement of the
public in the problems of our nation in his Message to the Congress
on the Environment. His call was for "greater citizen involve-
ment" since "[t]he tasks that need doing require money, resolve
and ingenuity-and they are too big to be done by government
alone."' 2  Whether or not problem solving is best effectuated by
1. Letter from Senator Edmund Muskie, September 20, 1971, on file
San Diego Law Review. Solicited comment in connection with proposed
amendment to Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, note 87
infra.
2. 116 CoNG. REC. 3095 (1970). The need for more participation in
administrative hearings and proceedings was sounded by Judge (now
Chief Justice) Burger in a decision involving the Federal Communica-
tions Commission:
The theory that the Commissioner can always effectively rep-
resent the listener interests ... without the aid and participation
of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private
attorneys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try
to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it
becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid
assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experi-
ence, neither we nor the Commissioner can continue to rely on it.
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003-4 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A
more precise statement was given by former FTC Commissioner Phillip
Elman:
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individual or concerted action is subject to continual debate. The
fact apparent is that individual action is the seldom chosen means
of involvement, with group affiliation being preferred.3
The inability of citizen groups to partake in the legislative pro-
cess coupled with the highly organized state of lobbying in the
business sector is the cause for much of the public concern and
frustration. A contributing factor to the lack of citizen involve-
ment is found in the Internal Revenue Code:
1. Public Charities: Section 501 (c) (3) permits tax exemption
for a charitable corporation if "no substantial part of the activities
of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation . . . . 4 As to the individual, Section 170
prohibits deductibility of contributions to such an "action" organ-
ization participating in the legislative process.;
2. Private Foundations:8 Section 4945(d) (1) prohibits any at-
Almost all observers of the regulatory process-in Congress, the
Executive Branch, the bar and academic community, and indeed
in the agencies themselves--are agreed on two central points:
(1) the agencies have, in general, failed to develop and imple-
ment regulatory policies fully responsive to public needs and the
public interest; and (2) a basic reason for such failure is the lack
of adequate citizen involvement and participation in agency pro-
ceedings.
Hearings on Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations Affecting Pov-
erty Programs Before a Subcomm. of Labor and Public Welfare, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Charitable Poverty Hear-
ings].
3. Such unification may stem from the perception of the individual
as being powerless in a nation of giants. In accord with the con-
temporary realities of the function of the individual is the pluralist theory
which points to the weakness in geographical representation. The theory
advances that better decision-making for society, at least over the long
run, will be produced where competing interest groups have a chance to
advocate and compromise in the decision-making process. See generally
H. KARIFL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALIsM (1961), W. CONNOLLY,
IN BrAs OF PLURALISM (1969).
4. INT. REV. CODE Ofl954, § 501(c) (3).
5. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(c) (2) (D) for the specific denial
of the deduction. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l(c) (3) (1959)
defining "action" organization.
6. INT. REV. CODE, § 509(a) defines "private foundations" to include
all tax exempt organizations under § 501 (c) (3) except:
(1) Churches, hospitals, schools and publicly supported organi-
zations.
(2) Organizations which deal with the public and as such re-
ceive more than one-third of their support from providing serv-
ices or from gross investment income.
tempt to influence legislation,' even where insubstantial in scope,
and provides for an integrated system of sanctions8 for any such
"taxable expenditures."9
3. Business Expenses: Section 162(e) allows deduction for all
ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses incurred in
direct connection with appearances before or communications with
committees or individual members of Congress or any legislative
body, provided such expenditures are in "respect to legislation or
proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer. . .. "10
The effect of the provisions posed may be characterized through
Biblical imagery. The individual must unite with his fellows to
form a small but courageous David going forth to do battle against
a huge, powerfully armored Goliath in the arena of law making.
The Internal Revenue Service is like a referee who rushes in to
check the weapons. While Goliath hefts his sword, spear and
battle axe unhindered, the referee threatens to disqualify David
for putting rocks instead of mud in his sling." An examination
of the reasons for arming each sector in such a fashion, the chal-
lenges to such inequitable weaponry and possible corrective action
are the considerations to be examined here.
II. DEVELOPIVIENT OF SECTION 501 (C) (3): PROSCRIPTION
OF SUBSTANTIAL LEGISLATIVE AcTmITY.
The enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses in 160112 pro-
vided for the protection and enforcement of then approved chari-
ties. It was realized that the word "charity" was an ever changing
and enlarging consideration and recognition and enforcement of
(3) Organizations which are operated in a "subsidiary" nature
to the above mentioned organizations.
(4) Organizations testing for public safety.
7. INT. REv. CoDE, § 4945(d) (1) (emphasis added). See text accom-
panying note 55 ifra, for exceptions.
8. See note 56 infra, regarding the method for levying the taxes and
penalties.
9. Section 4945 defines a "taxable expenditure" to include four other
categories of prohibited conduct: (1) influencing public elections and
voter registration drives; (2) grants to individuals unless approved in
advance and made on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis; (3)
failure of a private foundation to exercise "expenditure responsibility" for
grants to other private foundations and nonexempt organizations; (4) and
other nonexempt expenditures.
10. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(e) (1) (A), (B).
11. Adopted from a similar analogy made by Dean M. Kelly, Director
for the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. Charitable
Poverty Hearings, supra note 2, at 263.
12. The Statute of Elizabeth, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (repealed).
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new and novel charitable purposes and functions were accepted
as long as they came within the spirit of the enactment.
The English view, adopted by Massachusetts, held that a char-
itable trust seeking to secure legislative reform was not engaged in
a charitable purpose and hence could not stand.' 3 The duty of
the court in such an instance was to expound the laws as they
existed and not to assist in "the overthrowing or changing of
them.""' It was reasoned that the court had no means of judging
whether a proposed change in the laws would or would not be
for the public benefit, and therefore the court could not say
whether a gift to secure a legislative change was indeed charit-
able.'G
But the trend was established distinguishing between a trust
whose purpose was illegal and those which merely attempted to
change the existing law by lawful means.'" Thus, exclusive of
taxing considerations, charitable trusts which engaged in legisla-
tive activities were deemed charitable in the vast majority of
American jurisdictions, 1'7 with the majority being unconcerned
with the wisdom of the plan or change.
13. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867). A trust seeking
the abolition of slavery and the reform of the fugitive slave law was held
valid as a charity, while a trust to secure the passage of laws granting
women the right to vote, hold office, and deal with their property on an
equality with men, was invalid. As to the validity of the prior trust, an
unconsidered point was its contrariness to the fugitive slave laws then
existing in the Southern States. As to the invalidity of the latter trust,
Massachusetts adhered to its position when the son of the Jackson testator
came to court as settlor of a similar trust. Bowditch v. Attorney General,
241 Mass. 168, 134 N.E. 796 (1922).
14. Id. at 571.
15. Id.
16. "The trend of modern authority has been toward the upholding of
trusts which have for their object the creation of a more enlightened
public opinion, with a consequent change in laws having to do with hu-
man relations and rights in a republic such as ours. .. ." Collier v. Lind-
ley, 203 Cal. 641, 650, 266 P. 526, 529 (1928). See also Comment, 16
CAL. L. REV. 478 (1928); Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 988 (1951); 36 icH. L. REV.
139 (1937); But cf. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Organ-
ization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525-26 (1958).
17. "[A] trust for a public charity is not invalid merely because it con-
templates the procuring of such changes in existing laws as the donor
deems beneficial to the people in general, or to a class for whose benefit
the trust was created." Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 197, 116 A. 826, 827
(1922) (to promote improvement in the structure and the methods
of government). See also George v. Braddock, 45 N.J. Eq. 757, 18 A. 881
The creation of the present income tax scheme in 1913 granted
tax exempt benefits to charitable organizations.' 8 It would have
been reasonable to assume that the Treasury, in determining what
activities were charitable, would have followed the trend estab-
lished in charitable trust law. Such was not the case. Treasury
rulings' 9 and case law all evidenced the adoption by the Treasury
and the courts of the Massachusetts view defining "charitable"
as being exclusive of legislative activities.
20
The interpretive process determining the intent of the framers
with respect to exclusive charitable purposes culminated with
Slee v. Commissioner.21 Slee was denied deductibility of gifts to
the American Birth Control League since the group sought to
effect repeal and amendment of statutes dealing with birth con-
trol.22 But unlike the strict interpretation by the Treasury and
the Board of Tax Appeals prohibiting all activities, Judge Learned
(Ct. Err. & App. 1889) (reform of land laws); Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill.
App. 402 (1897) (attainment of woman suffrage prior to the passage of
the 19th Amendment); Buell v. Gardner, 83 isc. 513, 144 N.Y. Supp. 945
(Sup. Ct. 1914) (local prohibition); Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100 (1881)
(national prohibition); Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 P. 526 (1928)
(wide reform for American Indians); In Re Lewis' Estate, 152 Pa. 477,
25 A. 878 (1893) (prevention of discrimination against the "colored race").
18. Section 11(G) (a), Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114 provides or-
ganization exemption to those organizations organized and operated for
charitable purposes. The parallel deduction in computing net income was
provided by Section 1201(2), Act of October 3, 1917, 40 Stat. 300. The Act
of 1894 also made income tax inapplicable to organizations which were
"conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes." Act
of August 27, 1894, § 32, 28 Stat. 509. For development of early tax ex-
emption see Reiling, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?,
44 A.B.A.J. 525 (1958).
19. See, e.g., S. 1362, 2 Cum. BULL. 152 (1920) (denying tax exemp-
tion to an association which planned to promote uniformity of labor leg-
islation); O.D. 704, 3 Cum. BuLL. 240 (1920) (denying exemption to an
association which sought to further the enactment of prohibition laws).
Early Treasury position indicated that '" . . associations formed to dis-
seminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not educational within
the meaning of the statute." Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919), in T.D.
2831, 21 TRFAs. DEc. INT. REv. 285 (1920).
20. See, e.g., Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927) (denying exemp-
tion to association advocating legislation to attain the suppression of in-
temperance, gambling, and political corruption; and the substitution of
arbitration and conciliation for both industrial and international law); J.
Noah H. Slee, 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929) (denying deduction to an association
which sought to effect the lawful repeal and amendment of statutes deal-
ing with conception).
21. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
22. "The only part of its activities which can be thought to touch
upon legislation is in directing persons how best to prepare proposals for
change in the law, and in distributing leaflets to legislators and others
recommending such changes, chiefly by bringing before them such in-
formation as is supposed to 'enlighten' their minds." Id. at 185.
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Hand gave recognition to the fact that the tax exempt function
of charitable organizations may necessitate incidental activity in
the legislative process. 23 The existence of such a relationship
should not require loss of status if "[a]ll such activities are mediate
to the primary purpose . . . [and] . .. [t]he agitation is ancillary
to the end in chief, which remains the exclusive purpose of the
association." 24  Notwithstanding the possibility for allowing inci-
dental activities, the court declared:
Political agitation as such is outside that statute however inno-
cent the aim .... Controversies of that sort must be conducted
without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them.25
The validity of Slee has been criticized as being weak due to
its lack of argumentative and authoritative justification.26 None-
theless, the principle enunciated stands and was in substance in-
corporated into the Code in the Act of 1934 which conditioned
charitable exemption upon the proviso that activities which at-
tempt to influence legislation cannot be of a substantial degree.
2 7
The Congressional findings evidenced little in the way of a clear
and definitive reason for the proscription. Two Senatorial com-
ments, however, indicate that the relevant considerations may
have been a desire on the part of the federal government to
refrain from subsidizing such activities2s or to further curb, specif-
ically, actions which were motivated by purely personal interests.29
23. "[T]here are many charitable, literary and scientific ventures that
as an incident of their success require changes in the law." Id.
24. Id. (dictum).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Clark, The Limitations on Political Activities: A Discordant Note
in the Law of Charities, 46 V.A L. REV. 439 (1960). Clark alludes to the
decision's primacy in the field being due more to the eloquence and illus-
trious name of its author, than to the cogency of its argument.
27. INT. REV. CODE of 1934, § 101 (6), 48 Stat. 680 (now INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 501(c) (3) ).
28. Concerning the proviso regarding substantial legislative activities
and its desired applicability to other organizations:
[I] see no difference between one organization that might be on
one side of the fence getting contributions to propagandize and
influence legislation and being permitted to proceed without in-
terference, while at the same time preventing one that might have
a different viewpoint from receiving or making use of contribu-
tions for the same purpose.
78 CoNe. REc. 5861 (1934) (statement by Senator Harrison). The im-
plicit rejection of subvention here stems from Slee v. Commissioner, 42
F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930), see text accompanying note 25 supra.
29. "There is no reason in the world why a contribution... should be
In view of contemporary realities both policies appear to have
lost their justifying force as a means to found the continued ex-
istence of the provision.
3 0
Subsequent cases and Treasury action have been directed toward
a quantitative determination of the substantiality test 3' with ques-
tions remaining as to whether substantial is to be determined on
an absolute standard or with respect to total activities.32
III. DEVELOP ENT OF SECTION 162 (E): DEDucT BI iTY OF
EXPENSES INcURRED DURING LEGISLATIVE AcTIVITIES
OF DIRECT INTEREST TO BUSINESSES.
The Revenue Act of 1913 provided for the deductibility of all
"necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business"3 3
which was ruled very early by the Treasury to be exclusive of
expenditures incurred in attempts to influence legislation, without
regard to the legality or illegality of the activity pursued.34 Con-
trary to this approach, the Board of Tax Appeals approached each
case on an individual basis disallowing the deduction in instances
where the amounts expended were unnecessary,35 or the methods
deductible as if it were a charitable contribution if it is a selfish one made
to advance the personal interests of the giver of the money. That is what
the committee were [sic] trying to reach .... " 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934)
(statement by Senator Reed).
The necessity of the original prohibition and its continued existence in
fear of such motivations is questionable in light of two factors. First,
the "charitable" recognition itself was then and continues to be definable
to the exclusion of such selfish interests. See 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 481 (App.
1830). Secondly, it is highly unlikely that private interests are capable of
withstanding the democratic scrutinizing employed during the decision
making processes of tax exempt organizations. See FREMONT-SMITH,
FOUNDATIONS ANm GOVERNMENT (1965).
30. See text accompanying notes 51 and 77 infra.
31. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955). Using a
quantitative test the court held that if less than five per cent of the total
activities of an organization are devoted to influencing legislation, such
amount was to be regarded as insubstantial. See also Seasongood, Con-
tributions to a Tax Exempt Local Good-Government League, 35 TAXES
103 (1957); 18 MONT. L. Rv. 112 (1956).
32. Borod, Lobbying for the Public Interest-Federal Tax Policy and
Administration, 42 N.Y.U. L. RE. 1087, 107-08 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Borod].
33. Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 166, 167, 172.
34. T.D. 2137, 17 TnEAs. DEC. INT. Ruv. 48, 57, 58 (1915). "Sums of
money expended for lobbying purposes... are held not to be an ordinary
and necessary expense in the operation and maintenance of the business
of a corporation.. " Treas. Reg. 33, art. 143, 20 TREAs. DEC. INT. Ry.
197 (1920).
35. See, e.g., The Adler Company, 10 B.T.A. 849 (1928); Old Mission
Portland Cement Company, 25 BT.A. 305 (1933), aff'd 69 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1934).
[VOL. 9: 944, 1972] David Meets Goliath
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
employed were illegal,36 or the business itself was subject to
questions of legality.37 But in instances where the expenditures
were in fact ordinary and necessary, deductibility was found.38
Further confusion arose with the Ninth Circuit and the Board
taking opposing views39 which led to what appeared to be finality
of the issue in Cammarano v. United States.40
The Supreme Court in Cammoareno disallowed the deduction
of business expenses incurred by a liquor dealer in fighting legis-
lation inimical to his business interests without regard to the
lower court finding that the expenditures were not illegal, im-
moral nor in contravention of any defined public policy.4 1  Mr.
Justice Harlan, in an exacting manner, perceived:
[T]he deductions sought are prohibited by Regulation which them-
selves constitute an expression of a sharply defined national policy,
further demonstration of which may be found in other sections
[170(c)(2)(D) and 501(c)(3) of the 1954] Internal Revenue
Code.42
Mr. Justice Harlan's "sharply defined national policy" was sup-
ported upon two questionable bases. First, he found that Con-
gressional ratification of the administrative interpretation (i.e. the
Treasury Regulation disallowing legislative activities) was accom-
plished by the failure of Congress to amend the pertinent section,
such inaction being tantamount to policy adoption.43 Secondly,
36. See, e.g., G.T. Wofford, 15 B.T.A. 1225 (1929); Los Angeles & Salt
Lake R.R. Co., 18 B.T.A. 168 (1929).
37. See, e.g., William P. Kyne, 35 B.T.A. 202 (1936).
38. See, e.g., George Ringer & Company, 10 B.T.A. 1134 (1928).
39. Sunset Scavenger, 31 B.T.A. 758 (1934), rev'd 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.
1936).
40. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
41. It is admitted in the record that the sums here in question
were spent by the taxpayer for the purpose of defeating the en-
actment of certain legislation ... and being so, those sums are not
deductible from gross income. This is not to indicate that there
is anything evil or corrupt about spending money for these pur-
poses.... They had a right to do that and propriety of expendi-
tures therefor is not in question.
Cammarano v. United States, No. 1873 (W.D. Wash. March 19, 1956), 56-2
U.S. Tax. Cas. T 9878.
42. 358 U.S. at 508.
43. Failure to amend "requires the conclusion that the administrative
interpretation was ratified by Congress . . ." and the regulations "have ac-
quired the force of law." Id. at 510. The use of such a device for de-
termining Congressional policy is highly suspect as being a form of judi-
cial legislation. See, e.g., Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of In-
Congress by its action in 1934 (i.e. amending section 501(c) (3)
to deny tax exemption to charitable organizations which pursued
substantial legislative activities) apparently adopted the view of
Judge Learned Hand disfavoring public subvention of such legis-
lative activities.44 Thus, the Court reasoned in regard to expend-
itures to influence legislation, ". . . everyone in the community
should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as
the Treasury of the United States is concerned."'45 In accord with
the imposition upon charities with respect to legislative activities,
the government argued that the policy against public subvention
required denial of the deduction in order to further the "tax
equilibrium" as it then existed.46 The reliance by the Court on
the "equilibrium" argument47 provided the "equal footing to all"
rationale and has been considered to be the principle justification
for the decision.
48
Congress chose to repudiate the "tax equilibrium" theory and
explicitly allowed some subvention of legislative activities for busi-
nesses by revision of section 162(e) in the Revenue Act of 1962.
4
9
Opposition to the amendment indicates public subvention was con-
sidered and in reliance upon Cammarano it was stated that credits
"should not be given either to those who had a direct business
interest or to those who oppose the direct business interest and
fight for the general interest."50 Contrary to the voiced opposition,
come Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenses, 39 B.U.L. REV. 365 n. 80
(1959) and commentators cited therein.
44. See text accompanying note 25 supra, but cf. text accompanying
note 51 infra.
45. 358 U.S. at 513.
46. At the present time, under the prevailing interpretation of
[§ 162], any campaigns financed by industry to influence legisla-
tion cannot be charged to the Government by taking these ex-
penses as a deduction. The financing is thus entirely out of the
pocket of the concerns involved. This is equally true as to any
citizens' organization which might be formed to conduct similar
campaigns, since contributions to these campaigns would not
qualify as charitable contributions and accordingly are not de-
ductible. The same is true of labor organizations. Thus tax
equilibrium exists. If the expenses of the business community
were to become deductible, this tax equilibrium would be upset.
While the business community could deduct their expenses, all
others could not, even with respect to the same legislation.
Brief for Respondent, at 12, 35-36 (emphasis in original).
47. 358 U.S. at 513.
48. See Boehm, Taxes and Politics, 22 TAx L. REV. 369 (1967); but cf.
Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining
and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COL. L. REy. 801, 11-12
(1968), indicating that the equilibrium concept is inapplicable in a com-
parison of the two sectors, business and charity.
49. 76 Stat. 973 (1962).
50. 108 CoNG. REc. 17,767 (1962) (statement by Senator Douglas). The
general interest refers to the effects of section 501(c) (3) and points to the
substance of the inequities presently existing.
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Congress rejected the equality considerations for the more desir-
able policy "that taxpayers who have information bearing on the
impact of present laws, or proposed legislation ... are not [to be]
discouraged in making this information available to Members of
Congress or legislators at other levels of Government." 51
IV. PRIVATE FouNDATIoNs: PROHIBITION OF
ALL LEGISLATIVE AcTIViEs
The Tax Reform Act of 1969,52 in its attempt to correct the
abuses occurring under section 501(c) (3),53 recognized and pro-
vided restrictions upon the large, grant-making institutions char-
acterized as private foundations.54 The new law prohibits the
insubstantial degree of freedom in legislative activities granted
under the previous provisions to such foundations and invokes a
total prohibition of such activities. The prohibition is subject to
three exceptions which permit the private foundation (1) to make
available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study or research;
(2) to furnish technical advice or assistance in response to requests
by governmental bodies; (3) to attempt to influence legislation
concerning the existance of the private foundation, its powers and
duties, its tax exempt status, or the deduction of contributions
to it.5" In the event expenditures are made by the foundation for
prohibited activity, they are deemed to be "taxable expenditures"
and are subject to a system of taxes determined by the amount
of funds so expended. 56
The purpose of the restructuring appears to be an attempt to
attack past abuses with respect to political activities; such activi-
ties not being of a nature calculated to benefit all, as is the inherent
requisite of the charitable calling. More particularly, occasional
51. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
52. PuB. L. No. 91-172 amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954.
53. See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
54. See note 6, supra, defining "private foundations".
55. INT. REV. CODE, § 4945 (e) (2).
56. Section 4945(a) imposes an "initial tax" of ten percent of the ex-
penditure so incurred on the foundation and two and one-half percent of
the expenditure on a "knowing" manager. If corrective action is not
taken "additional taxes" are imposed under section 4945(b) to the extent
of 100 percent of the expenditure upon the foundation and 50 percent
upon the manager if he refuses to agree to the correction. Wilful or re-
peated flagrant acts invoke a penalty under section 6684 equal to the
amount of tax incurred under section 4945.
abuses had been noted with respect to particular political candi-
dates or particular political parties.57 Also advanced were the ad-
vantages attributed to larger foundations under section 501(c) (3)
permitting a greater amount of "prohibited activities" due to the
substantiality test which was gauged in relation to total activi-
ties.58  And, in the event of loss of status, the larger foundations
were better equipped to take advantage of the alternative forms
of tax exemption.59
V. CHALLENGES
The propriety of the present taxing imbalance in respect to
legislative activities between business and charitable organizations
is susceptible to critical challenge under constitutional analysis
and contemporary social demands.
A. Constitutional
A preliminary question always to be considered in analyzing the
constitutional impropriety of the benefits and burdens imposed un-
der income taxing provisions is their constant characterization as
being matters determined solely within the legislative grace of
Congress. 6
0
A relevant consideration is the potential for Congressional grace
being subverted to the grace of the Internal Revenue Service in
its ad hoc determinations. A general appraisal of the charitable
provision under consideration indicates that it is unusual in the
sense that it does not delineate the operative procedures for de-
termining income. Rather than being transactional in nature, sec-
tion 501(c)(3) is determinative of an overall status which may
become muddled, with eventual denial of status, when a "sub-
stantial" amount of the proscribed activity is calculated to exist.61
57. HousE Comm. ON WAYS & EAfNS, TAx REFORM ACT OF 1969, H.R.
REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 32 (1969); SENATE COMM.
ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., at 47 (1969).
58. Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means,
91st Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 808-10 (1969).
59. HousE CoM¢nM. ON WAYS & MIANs, TAX REFOrm ACT OF 1969. H.R.
REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 32 (1969).
60. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). Commenta-
tors have challenged the resultant discriminatory effect in the develop-
ment of the law concerning "privileges" and "rights". See generally
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Con-
dition: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443
(1966).
61. Statutes touching on speech must be narrowly drawn so that ad-
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A second weakening factor of the legislative grace argument
has been its demise in the eyes of the Supreme Court when such
grace touches upon protected speech. In Speiser v. Randall,62 a
California statute which conditioned the grant of a veteran's prop-
erty tax exemption on the taking of a loyalty oath was declared
unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court in determining
the extent of the restriction on speech recognized only that condi-
tions imposed upon the granting of privileges or gratuities be
"reasonable". The Supreme Court was more exacting:
To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms
of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its de-
terrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for
this speech. The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argu-
ment that, because a tax exemption is a "privilege" or "bounty"
its denial may not infringe speech.6 3
Subsequent decisions have continued the erosion of the condition-
ing of a governmental benefit or gratuity upon the surrender of
a constitutional right as a condition of that favor.6 4
The right to petition, which embraces the free and equal op-
portunity of each constituent to communicate his ideas and opin-
ions to his representatives, give rise to conflicting interests in its
application to charitable organizations. Although the right to
petition is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it is one
of the basic freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights.65
ministrative officials may not use them to arbitrarily discriminate between
speakers. It has been urged that the statute here is not worded with suffi-
cient clarity and specificity to insure that the administrators cannot use
it to discriminate. See Note, The Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics,
73 Yale L.J. 661, 663 & n. 12 (1964) indicating the question of IRS
favoritism towards certain religious beliefs (i.e. theistic) over others
(i.e. non-theistic). Borod, supra note 32, at 1106-10 (1967). Also the
vagueness of the "substantiality" test creates an uncertainty which tends
to result in a chilling effect and unduly intimidates potential speakers.
See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959).
62. 357 U.S. 513 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Speiser].
63. Id. at 518.
64. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensa-
tion); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (a license to practice law).
65. "The [right to petition] would seem unnecessary to be expressly
provided for in a republican government since it results from the very
nature of its structure and institutions." 2 STony oN THE CONSTITUTION
§ 1894 (4th ed. 1873); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
The extent to which the right to petition may be availed by
corporations6 6 in light of our system of equal representation and
our notions of "one man one vote" is debatable. One contention
is that large corporations, economic associations, charitable organ-
izations and other group affiliations should not be considered
"people" within the meaning of the right to petition under the
first amendment since they are not the "people" who "elect" under
the meaning of the Constitution.07 The result of including such
organizations within the right to petition would be to undermine
equal individual representation with the furtherance of functional
representation. Such functional representation in the state legis-
latures has been held to constitute a violation of equal protection. 8
Nonetheless, the extent to which equal representation is in fact
accomplished today is doubtful considering the highly organized
state of lobbying in all sectors, including the government itself.0 9
The encouragement of businesses to influence legislation under
162(e) is an indirect form of functional representation since it
results in the advancement of the ideas, opinions and desires of
the business entities rather than those ideas, opinions and desires
of individual persons.
The subtle encouragement of functional representation through
deduction of expenses for appearances to influence legislation rele-
vant to a business entity supports a similar allowance for charities.
Such charitable organizations often desire legislation which busi-
ness groups oppose, they can argue that unless they are allowed
to fight deductible "lobbying" with "lobbying" paid for by de-
ductible contributions, the business groups who are allowed the
deduction will be given an unfair advantage in the exercise of
their first amendment freedoms. The Supreme Court in Cammar-
ano recognized this potential in its application of Speiser to the
facts. The Court noted that the conditions infringing upon first
amendment freedoms were uniform70 and any granting of deduc-
66. On the right to petition and its application to corporations, see gen-
erally Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying Antitrust, and the Right to
Petition, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1211, 1242-46 (1967).
67. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2. See Walden, supra note 72, at 1245.
68. "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests." Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
69. Concerning the propriety of various activities by executive agencies,
Representative Curtis (R. Mo.) has commented: "[Executive agencies]
. ..have a forum... in the Congressional Committees, and they should
use it. They also have the ability to communicate directly with the
people, as the President does on TV time .... So lets have a cessation of
Executive officials [and] cabinet officers coming into Congressmen's
offices." Legislators and the Lobbyists, CONG. Q. SERV., p. 17 (1965).
70. "Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they en-
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tions to business would upset the "tax equilibrium".71 The amend-
ment of section 162 subsequent to Cammarano has indeed created
the imbalance which the Court so deftly sought to avoid.
The previous examination of the historical aspects of the three
provisions may aid in the search for a justification limiting legis-
lative activities of charitable organizations. As previously men-
tioned, the justification developed by the Treasury and Judge
Learned Hand in Slee, the policy against governmental subvention
of legislative activities, 72 was considered and rejected by Congress
in the adoption of section 162(e). 73 Two potential areas of abuse,
however, appear to be the underlying justifications for the restric-
tion of legislative activities. First, as previously mentioned, the
charitable exclusion is founded upon a determination that the
charitable activities must be activities for the betterment of all and
should exclude those activities which are motivated by purely
selfish interests.74 Secondly, the motivations which led to reform
in the area of private foundations appear to be the apprehensions
which have always underlied the restriction. That is, the abuses
occurring in the political arena were demanding of correction.
75
Assuming that the governmental purposes of the restriction are
indeed legitimate and substantial, the prohibition of substantial
legislative activities for charities may be an overly broad means of
attaining the permissible end.76 The question being whether pro-
hibiting personal gain and direct "political" activities lend them-
selves to a narrower means of attainment than by indiscriminate
proscription of the legislative activities of charities. The business
deduction permits attempts to influence legislation if such attempts
are of a direct interest to the taxpayer. Permitting charitable
organizations to influence legislation of direct interest to their
purpose would maintain the desired result of prohibiting selfish
gage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required
to pay for those activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone
else engaging in similar activities is required to do under provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code." 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
71. Id.
72. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
74. See note 29 supra.
75. See note 57 supra.
76. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964).
gain. The purpose having been deemed charitable would continue,
merely to be augmented by legislative activity.
77
Although 501(c) (3) also prohibits intervention in any political
campaign on the behalf of any candidate,78 the requirements im-
posed upon private foundations are more direct and specific in
that they restrict communications with individual public officers.70
Albeit campaign involvement is a legitimate concern, it is the
nefarious activities which transpire with individual public offi-
cers which are objectionable and not legitimate business conducted
with legislative bodies. The exactness of the foundational re-
strictions and their ability to reach the contemplated conduct are
easily adaptable to charitable organizations and allow the end
(restriction of political activities as opposed to blanket legislative
activities) to be more narrowly achieved without unnecessarily
sweeping into the right to petition one's legislator.
B. Social
Changing social conditions have necessitated an increase of gov-
ernmental involvement in the charitable sector, casting doubt up-
on the ability of the charitable sector and the public in general
to effectively "fend for itself" without governmental intervention.
With the expanding role which government has played in the
field of charitable work, a greater need has developed for a charit-
able "voice."
In addition to continued devotion to ameliorating the condition
of the poor and sick, the call of the present day charitable organ-
ization is to seek out the causes of economic and social injustices.
The charitable calling has enlarged from the hospitals, old peoples'
homes, and orphanages to the environmental groups, civil rights
groups, poverty groups, consumer advocate groups and public in-
terest law firms. The facts of contemporary charitable activity
and its attempts "to lessen the burdens of government"80 are
thwarted by the very legal framework within which it operates
by being effectively denied a voice in the arena where enduring
solutions are created.
77. This is not to say that the charitable purpose pursued would be
without private gain to the members, but such gain would be a mere inci-
dent of the benefit for all.
78. INT. REV. CODE, § 501(c) (3).
79. INT. REV. CODE, § 4945(e) (2) (emphasis added).
80. The definition of allowable charitable purposes adopted by the
Treasury includes the concept of lessening the burdens of government.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3) -l(d) (2) (1959). The language appears to
have its origin in Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556
(1867). See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
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Increased social and economic activity by the government has
been accompanied by a reversal in its attitude toward public sub-
vention of legislative activity. Instances of subsidization and di-
rect employment by the government for such services in the
legislative and judicial forums are numerous.8 1
Democratic political theory assumes that rational decisions can
be best reached after hearing and evaluating the interests of com-
ponent members. These interests are in theory expressed by
individuals through the medium of their elected representatives
in legislature. Election of these representatives on a geographical
basis overlooks the fact that individuals identify their interests to
a greater extent with business, economic, social, or fraternal groups
than with state or political subdivisions. The failure of the Con-
stitution to provide for group representation and the subtle en-
couragement of those with direct and appreciable business interests
to actively legislate, results in a great disparity in representation
for the individual citizen. The general interest of the citizen and
taxpayer, and the general and diffused interest of the consumer
receive no deduction when lobbying is engaged upon in their be-
half.8
2
The need has been expressed by legislators for active participa-
tion by groups which concern themselves with the problem areas
presently pursued by charitable organizations. 83 Legislators, in-
81. The Congressional Research Service, see text accompanying notes
83, 84 infra, and the Neighborhood Legal Services funded by the Office of
Economic Opportunity exemplify funding by the government of activities
which attempt to read and react to public demands in a manner which
may be deemed "political" or "controversial" in nature.
82. An example of the potential of this disparity was shown by Senator
Douglas when the adoption of section 162 (e) was being considered.
Let us consider the gas bill which Senator Kerr sponsored.
To the gas and oil industry that bill meant $600 million a year.
But to the 30 million householders who use gas to cook and heat
it meant on the average of only $20 a year. Very few people will
become sufficiently interested in the subject, study it, and then
be able to afford to come to Washington to lobby against it when
only $20 for each is involved. As a result, the powerful interests
of the producing groups are strong and vigorous. The diffused
general interest groups are weak.
108 CONG. REc. 17,767 (1962).
83. "[WIe are passing laws and spending money to deal with all these
problems [of poverty], but our information is poor. We don't understand
the problem. I don't see how we are ever going to straighten this out until
we understand the problem." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Execu-
tive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th
capable of personally investigating every governmental problem,
have become dependent upon the influential activities of the Con-
gressional Research Services. 4 The detached and bare objectivity
with which the Research Service functions makes desirable the
activities of charitable organizations which, with their first hand
knowledge of the problems, pursue potential solutions with en-
thusiasm and vigor and are capable of providing findings in
greater depth. It may be that in certain instances the activities of
charitable organizations may result in a duplication of effort with
those of the Research Service. In such instances, indirect subsidy
through deductible charitable contributions may indeed prove less
costly to the taxpayer than direct appropriation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the deep seated observance of legislative grace and the
abhorrence of judicial nullification of income taxing provisions in
the past, constitutional invalidity of the prohibition of legislative
activity seems unlikely. Administrative reform has been advo-
cated by certain commentators; it being proposed that the under-
lying statutory purpose of the restriction, prevention of personal
gain, be distinguished to a greater extent by the development of
guidelines which de-emphasize legislative activities per se and the
"abstract ruminations over what is 'substantial' ".85
The reform most needed is statutory. Recognizing that charit-
able organizations "can be a valuable source of information; they
can broaden legislators' understanding of proposed legislation; and
they can suggest valuable legislative alternatives",8 6 a recent pro-
posal has been geared to permit legislative activities of a direct
interest to a charitable organization.87 The essence of the pro-
posed amendment allows statements or communications to the leg-
islative bodies by charitable and educational organizations on mat-
ters directly affecting any purpose for which such organizations
are organized and operated. The amendment would not change
Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 5, at 1115 (1966) (statement by Senator Ribicoff).
See also Note, The Poor and the Political Process: Equal Access to Lobby-
ing, 6 HARv. J. LEG. 369 (1969).
84. 2 U.S.C. § 166 (1970).
85. Borod, note 32 supra at 1117. An appealing measure which would
grant equal treatment to all regardless of taxing status is the voucher sys-
tem. See Note, The Poor and the Political Process: Equal Access to Lob-
bying, 6 HARv. J. LEG. 369 (1969).
86. 117 CONG. REC. S 4069 (daily ed. March 30, 1971) (statement by
Senator Muskie).
87. CoxG. REC.: S 1408, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. S 4070
(daily ed. March 30, 1971).
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the present restrictions on mass attempts to influence the general
public (grassroots lobbying),ss nor would it permit political cam-
paign involvement nor change the proscription of legislative
activities for private foundations. The desire of the framers of
the bill is to assure that Congress will have the most complete
record possible when it considers legislation.
It must be noted that even with legislative equality provided
to the extent possible, inequities will always exist. It is the poor
or the non-taxpayers who shall always be unafforded the benefits
conferred on others through tax deductions and tax credits. But
perhaps this problem was indirectly recognized at the inception
in 1913.
"Mr. Williams: Mr. President, the object of this bill is to tax a
man's net income; that is to say, what he has at the end of the
year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses.
It is not to reform men's moral characters, that is not the object
of the bill at all."9
But the benefits to be provided by legislative activity which are
inherently denied the poor or non-taxpayers under the taxing in-
justices stand greater probabilities of being prosecuted through
charitable organizations than by remaining without a voice at allY0
EDWARD W. WACHTEL
88. See Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobby-
ing: Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COL. L. REV.
801 (1968).
89. 50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913).
90. Subsequent to the writing of this article, hearings were held on an
alternative bill, H.R. 13720, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), on May 2, 1972.
The bill is supported by five members of the Ways and Means Committee
and would allow five percent of total expenditures for attempts to in-
fluence legislation which is not related to the tax exempt purpose. As to
activities directly related to the tax exempt purpose, H.R. 13720 would
allow twenty percent of total expenditures to influence such legislation.
